This paper discusses thirteenth and fourteenth-century Byzantine perceptions of civil wars, which were a common feature in the late Byzantine period. It investigates how the most important authors of the period understood and defined the idea of civil war. It explores the Byzantine understanding of the differences between military conflicts which were fought between subjects and employees of the emperor and wars the empire fought against its external enemies. In addition, it examines the views the imperial authorities and the authors of the period express about wars against enemies with whom the later Byzantines shared a common cultural, ethnic and religious background.
This article will examine thirteenth and fourteenth-century Byzantine concepts of armed conflicts which can be defined as civil wars (emfulioi polemoi). Wars between aristocratic clans and between members of the inner imperial family were a common feature in the later Byzantine period. However, not many scholars have attempted to provide a definition of the idea of civil war in late Byzantium. In his discussion of Byzantine attitudes towards warfare, W. Treadgold suggested 'as a working definition of Byzantine civil war an armed conflict in which a significant number of Byzantine soldiers fought on both sides with a significant number of casualties.' 1 This is a reasonable definition and, possibly, applicable to most internal conflicts in Byzantium before 1204. However, it cannot describe accurately the complexities of the internal armed conflicts in late Byzantium. The presence of a significant number of Byzantine soldiers fighting on both sides was not necessary, since the Byzantine government had employed a large number of mercenary soldiers from outside the empire. Many of these mercenaries, such as the Catalan Grand Company, which was recruited by Andronikos II (1282-1328) in 1302, were large and self-interested bodies of soldiers that had their own internal organization. In 1305, disputes over payment and mutual mistrust resulted in an armed conflict between the Byzantine state and the Catalan Grand Company. Was this conflict a civil war, given that the Catalans were employees of the Byzantine emperor? In addition, some of the enemies of the so-called empire of Nicaea and of the early Palaiologan rulers shared a common ethnic, cultural and religious identity with them. Were the wars against them viewed as civil wars?
The complexities of the concept of civil war in later Byzantium are reflected in the accounts of the historians of the period. The most important source for the history of the so-called empire of Nicaea, George Akropolites, does not use the term civil war (emfulioj polemoj). Nonetheless, he makes the distinction between the war against an external enemy and the war against internal enemies. He calls the conspiracy of a group of Nicaean aristocrats against John III Vatatzes (1221-1254), which took place in 1224/1225, 'internal war' as opposed to the 'external war' (esw polemoj and exw polemoj) against the Latin empire of Constantinople. As he writes, the emperor learnt about the conspiracy while he was residing in Lampsakos and he destroyed the triremes with fire so that they will not fall into the hands of the Italians ‰The Latin Empire of ConstantinopleŠ and, judging the internal war to be of more importance than the external one, he left from there and went to the area of Achyraous, and there he made an investigation of the plot. 2
Pachymeres makes numerous references to the idea and definition of civil war and, unlike Akropolites, he uses the term emfulioj polemoj to refer to internal armed conflicts. He states that upon the coronation of Michael VIII (1259-1282) the Nicaean magnates took an oath of loyalty to him. Pachymeres believes that they did so out of fear and because they wanted to avoid being blamed for causing civil wars, if they opposed him. 3 Furthermore, Pachymeres considers the military conflict which was the result of the rebellion of the inhabitants of the area of Zygenoi around Nicaea (1262) as a civil war. He writes that when Michael VIII was informed about the rebellion, he was enraged and sent the whole army to fight civil wars. 4 Similarly, he considers the conflict which followed the rebellion of the general and nephew of the emperor, Alexios Philanthropenos, in Asia Minor in 1295 as a civil war. 5 Therefore, Pachymeres defines as being civil wars, the conspiracy of the aristocratic elite against the emperor, the response of the throne to a revolt in a rural provincial area in the early 1260s and the rebellion of a high-ranking military commander and member of the wider imperial family in the 1290s.
Moreover, Pachymeres implies that a common ethnic, cultural and religious identity is not the exclusive criterion for distinguishing a civil war from a war against external enemies. In 1301, Andronikos II employed a large group of Alan mercenaries. In 1302, they participated in the failed campaigns of the co-emperor Michael IX (1294-1320) in Magnesia and of the megaj etaireiarchj Leo Mouzalon in Bithynia. Shortly afterwards, the Alans announced their intention to leave the empire. Pachymeres relates that when the Alans decided to depart, Andronikos II sent the megaj domestikoj Alexios Raoul to get back the weapons and horses the emperor had provided the Alans with. The Alans resisted and as Pachymeres comments, 'a dispute and civil battle (mach fuletikh) broke out. Although the armies were of different race, they were placed under a single authority, the imperial one. Therefore, this was a civil war (emfulioj polemoj).' 6 In the same context, Pachymeres describes the fighting between the Catalan Grand Company and the Byzantine government as a civil war. For instance, he argues that although by the end of March of 1304 had received their salaries, the Catalans did not campaign. Instead, they were involved in fighting civil wars. In addition, he remarks that members of the court of the co-emperor Michael IX, who after his failure to resist the advance of the Turcoman principalities in Asia Minor had established his court in Adrianople, complained of the attitude of the Catalans and requested to fight against them. Michael IX refrained them; however, he asked his father and senior emperor, Andronikos II, not to allow the Catalans march to Thrace because this would cause a civil war between the Byzantines and the Catalan Grand Company. 7 Pachymeres' understanding of the idea of civil war emphasizes the political and economic and not the cultural and ethnic identity of the fighting parties. The Alans and the Catalans were not culturally connected to the Byzantines. They were not Romans. However, since they served in the Byzantine army they had economic bonds with the Byzantine state and were employees of the emperor. Therefore, the wars against them were internal wars, civil wars. Pachymeres' account of the conflict between the Byzantine state and its foreign mercenaries implies that the term emfulioj polemoj (a war fought between people of the same race/ethnicity) does not fully correspond to the nature of these conflicts. However, the absence of an appropriate term to describe accurately the conflicts between subjects or employees of the emperor who were of diverse cultural background led him to use the term 'emfulioj polemoj.'
The period 1321-1354 was characterized by large-scale civil wars. The civil war which was fought intermittently from 1321 until 1328 between Andronikos II and his grandson Andronikos III (1328-1341) was a war fought between those who possessed the largest shares of the empire's resources under Andronikos II and those who by Michael IX's unexpected death in 1320 lost their hope of gaining imperial favour and their priority in claiming offices and imperial grants. In 1341, the unexpected death of Andronikos III was followed by the outbreak of a civil war between John Kantakouzenos (John VI, 1347-1354), who claimed to be the defender of the legitimate rights of Andronikos III's son, John V Palaiologos (1341-1391) and the regency in Constantinople, which was led by the megaj doux Alexios Apokaukos, the patriarch John Kalekas and Andronikos III's widow, Anna of Savoy. This civil war, which ended in 1347 with the victory of Kantakouzenos' party, was a conflict among aristocratic cliques, which fought over access to the empire's dwindling resources through the exertion of influence on the throne. The rival parties relied on networks based on kinship, common interest and patronage. 8 Kantakouzenos, who was one of the main protagonists of these civil wars, as a result of which the empire suffered dramatic territorial losses, stresses repeatedly that these were conflicts fought between people of the same ethnic group (omofuloi). The enemy parties were connected by social, cultural, religious and family bonds. It seems, though, that the term omofuloi in the Histories of Kantakouzenos refers more to the leaders of the fighting parties and to the people of Byzantine towns who suffered the consequences of the war that was fought between claimants of the imperial authority and less to the opposing armies, which were largely composed of non-Byzantine mercenaries and allies. It is difficult to ascertain whether Kantakouzenos would consider any conflict similar to that between the Byzantine state and the Alans and the Catalans as civil war, since no such conflict took place during the period he describes in his Histories. Nonetheless, foreign mercenaries were an integral part of the armies that fought in the civil wars and the Histories of Kantakouzenos show that many of them, such as those who received from him the title of kavallarioi and played a leading role in the ceremony of his coronation in 1341, did not lack political and social ties with the Byzantine society. 9 Therefore, they were not viewed as outsiders and different from the native soldiers.
Moreover, Kantakouzenos repeatedly contrasts the Byzantine civil wars which were wars fought between omofuloi with the wars against the 'infidel,' 'impious barbarians' and 'natural enemies' of the empire implying the Turks. 10 In 1322, when the forces of Andronikos III besieged and captured the town of Apros which was under the control of forces loyal to his grandfather Andronikos II, Kantakouzenos stated that no soldier from either side died in the battle, nor were any of the prisoners killed, because special care was shown by the younger Andronikos and God helped. According to Kantakouzenos, Andronikos III said, 'we should fight against the barbarians until the end. Against the omofuloi we should fight as much as is profitable.' 11 In 1322, during the negotiations that led to the end of the first phase of the civil war of 1321-1328, Kantakouzenos remarked that the victory against those of the omofuloi should be considered not as a victory, but instead, as the most shameful defeat. 12 When in 1327, the army loyal to Andronikos III led by Theodore Synadenos defeated an army led by Constantine Asan close to Constantinople, Andronikos III allegedly regretted that the dead were Byzantines and feared that some of them might have been very closely related to him. He considered that it would have been a great honour if they had fallen fighting the barbarians. 13 The accentuation of the ethnic and religious identity of the Byzantines, who instead of fighting civil wars, should unite and fight against the impious barbarians is explained by the personal motives of Kantakouzenos. It does not mean that Kantakouzenos regretted the wars against his omofuloi. Nor does it reflect the prevalence of an ideology which emphasized the religious, ethnic and cultural identity of the Byzantines in the wars against the Turks. The aim of Kantakouzenos was to justify his involvement in the civil wars and to exonerate himself from the charge that he contributed to the expansion of the Turks by using them as allies and mercenaries in the civil conflicts of the 1340s and 1350s. Moreover, the most important military operations led by Andronikos III and Kantakouzenos relied heavily on the military aid of Turcoman principalities and it should not be forgotten that Kantakouzenos compiled his account in the 1360s when the Ottomans were starting to expand in Europe at the expense of the Byzantines. 14 Another fourteenth-century author who comments on the idea and nature of civil war in Byzantium and more specifically on the armed conflicts between members of the inner circle of the imperial family is the orator Theodore Potamianos. He refers to the conflict between John V and his son Andronikos IV (1376-1379) as a difference between the emperors. After the two rulers reached an agreement Potamianos wrought in 1382, 'we should be grateful, for the emperors finally put an end to their differences and saved us from a bleak fate.' He attributes the conflict to what he calls the littleness of the soul of the rulers and he is aware of the consequences the differences between the emperors have on state affairs. In a letter to Demetrios Kydones, he wrote, 'the civil war between the two emperors dragged the land of the Romans to this point of misfortune. As a result undeserv-ing people have chanced upon the greatest honours and contrary to all justice and honours have amassed great wealth.' 15
The observation that the Byzantine civil wars were fought either between subjects and employees of the emperor, or between people of the same ethnicity (omofuloi) raises the question of the Byzantine identity when the empire waged wars against enemies with whom the Byzantines shared a common cultural and religious background, such as the state of Epiros and the principality of Thessaly. 16 These military conflicts have been treated as civil wars by modern scholars. 17 This interpretation relies on the fact that Epiros, Thessaly and Trebizond were 'Byzantine' successor states to the Byzantine empire which disintegrated in 1204. However, the rulers of these states and their subjects were not always seen as Byzantines by late Byzantine authors. And when they were viewed as Romans, the wars against them were not called civil wars. For Akropolites, who had personal reasons to dislike the Epirots, since he had been a prisoner of Michael II Komnenos Doukas (1230-1271), the state of Epiros together with the Turks, Bulgarians and Latins were the enemies of Nicaea. 18 For Akropolites, Romans are those who are with or on the side of the rulers of the so-called empire of Nicaea. 19 Therefore, the brother and successor of the ruler of Epiros Michael I Komnenos Doukas (1204-1215), Theodore Komnenos Doukas (1215-1230), was 'with the emperor of the Romans, Theodore I Lakaris (1204-1221), serving him like the rest of the Romans.' When in 1217 Theodore Komnenos Doukas defeated and captured the Latin emperor of Constantinople, Peter of Courtenay 'this was a great help to the Romans.' 20 However, when Theodore was proclaimed emperor in Thessalonica, he and his subjects became enemies of the empire. 21 Describing the annexation of Thessalonica, by John III in 1246, Akropolites states that the city became subject 'to the Romans, for those who had ruled it were opposed to the Romans.' 22 In his account of a conspiracy orchestrated by Michael II Komnenos Doukas and his uncle Theodore Komnenos Doukas, Akropolites relates that John III considered no others to be enemies of the empire of the Romans after the conquests of Constantinople, if not they. These statements show that in his narrative of Epirote affairs, Akropolites adopts the point of view of the so-called empire of Nicaea according to which the Epirots were not proper Romans. They are 'the western race' and 'the inhabitants of the western parts'. 23 This approach reflects one of the consequences of the events of the period 1204-1261, which was the retreat of ideas concerning the unique position of the empire in the oikoumenh and its mission to spread Christianity. 24 The successor states to the Byzantine empire knew that they were the products of the abnormalities caused by the capture of Constantinople by the Crusaders in 1204 and believed that the real Byzantine empire would be restored only when the Latins were expelled from Constantinople. 25 After the recovery of Constantinople in 1261, imperial propaganda revived Komnenian models and traditional ideological claims of ecumenism which had faded in the period 1204-1261. 26 The revival of ideas of imperial ecumenism supported the claim of world supremacy and of the preservation of imperial rule over the Christian oikoumenh, which, as the megaj logoqethj Theodore Metochites comments, was much larger than the territories controlled by the Byzantine state. 27 This ideological framework could have permitted the development of concepts which represented the wars against Christian enemies of Byzantium as civil wars. This is indicated by an event reported by Pachymeres. He writes that in 1265 the patriarch Arsenios met Michael VIII who had returned from a failed campaign against Epiros. In this meeting, the patriarch reminded the emperor that he had prohibited him from campaigning against Christians, stating that there is nothing profitable in such campaigns. Arsenios told Michael VIII that he should thank God for saving his soul from the enemies, who were seeking it, referring to the combined Tatar and Bulgarian attack in Thrace in 1264, which put Michael VIII, who at that time was campaigning in the west against Epiros, in a very difficult position. Arsenios reminded the emperor that he had opposed the campaign against Michael II Komnenos Doukas, urging him not to provoke civil wars (emfuliouj polemouj). The patriarch also stated that Michael II Komnenos Doukas, was a Christian like Michael VIII. The prayers of the patriarch for Michael VIII are equally prayers for the Epirots because both belong to the folk of Christ. 28 Therefore, the patriarch of Constantinople considers the military conflict between the Byzantine empire and the state of Epiros as civil wars. The Epirots were Christians and consequently the war against them was a civil war. Arsenios' statement is the only instance in which the wars against Epiros are called civil wars. The lack of similar information indicates that probably the patriarch expressed his personal views concerning the nature of the conflict between Byzan-tium and Epiros and the role of the patriarchate. Furthermore, the bad relations between Arsenios and Michael VIII should be seen as the main reason why the patriarch opposed the emperor's wars against Epiros. 29 Nevertheless, the available evidence indicates that the revival of traditional ideas of imperial ecumenism enabled the Palaiologoi to identify the wars they waged as wars aiming at the restoration of imperial rule over territories which they claimed as legitimately parts of the Byzantine empire. In this ideological framework the wars against the state of Epiros and the principality of Thessaly were not called civil wars but military actions against rebels. It may be argued that the identification of the other 'Byzantine' political entities as rebels implies a civil conflict. Indeed, unlike the Laskarids, the Palaiologoi viewed the Epirots as proper Romans. However, they were not subjects of the emperor although they ought to be so. Therefore, by promoting the idea that the rulers of Epiros and Thessaly were rebels, the Palaiologoi claim that they fought against enemies who resisted their established and legitimate rule. In his autobiography, Michael VIII states that in 1259 in the battle of Pelagonia, where the Byzantine army defeated the combined forces of the Epirots, the Latin principality of Achaia and their German allies, he defeated the 'Romans who had defected long ago.' 30 In the tupikon for the monastery of the archangel Michael, Michael VIII refers to 'the terrible raging against us of the renegades who are of the same Roman race as we.' 31 In 1262, John Palaiologos, Michael VIII's brother, campaigned against Michael II Komnenos Doukas. According to Pachymeres, John Palaiologos justified this campaign by stating that Michael II could no longer claim that he had the right to occupy imperial lands, using the justification that the emperor was outside of the patrij (Constantinople), since the emperor was restored to Constantinople. 32 In his account of the campaign of Andronikos III against the Epirots in 1339/1340, Kantakouzenos writes that the Angeloi had not gained their authority by liberating Epiros from barbarians. Instead, they were subjects of the Byzantine emperors and received from them the annual administrative authority over the land. However, they took advantage of the war between Byzantium and the armies of the Fourth Crusade and usurped the imperial authority over Epiros. When the Latins were expelled and the Byzantine rulers unified the parts of Europe and Asia they had for- merly ruled, they demanded Epiros from the Angeloi. However, they were not given it. Consequently, by campaigning against the Epirots, as Kantakouzenos concludes, Andronikos III is claiming his paternal authority. It has been argued that Kantakouzenos alludes to the fact that when Theodore Komnenos Doukas left Asia Minor for Epiros about 1207 to take over after the death of his brother he was made to swear an oath of loyalty to the rulers of Nicaea. 33 It is worth noting that this imperial view of the wars against the Epirots is confirmed by a document compiled by the patriarch John Kalekas. The patriarch writes that when John Doukas Orsini (1325-1335) had died, the people of Ioannina should have thought sensibly and submitted to God's empire, as they ought to do. The Angeloi should rule Epiros as provincial governors and not as independent rulers. 34 This document is an indication that the views expressed by the patriarch Arsenios in the 1260s did not reflect the official imperial and ecclesiastical position according to which, the Epirots were Romans, however, the wars against them were military operations against rebels who defied the authority of the emperor in Constantinople and established their own independent political entity. Moreover, the principle of fighting for the re-imposition of imperial rule was compatible with the Byzantine ideas of the Just War as expressed in Byzantine legal texts and historical accounts of earlier periods of Byzantine history and have been analyzed by Angeliki Laiou. For instance, according to the Eisagoge, which was promulgated by the emperors Basil I, (867-886), Leo VI (886-912) and , the purpose of the emperor is to safeguard and maintain through his virtue to the things which exist; to acquire through vigilance the things lost; and to recover through his wisdom and through just victories the things which are absent. 35 It has been shown that before 1204 there were instances which indicate that wars against Christian peoples could be viewed as civil wars. In the early tenth century, the patriarch Nicholas I Mystikos wrote numerous letters to the Bulgarian ruler Symeon (893-927) presenting the conflict between Byzantium and the Bulgarians as civil wars because both sides were Christians. For instance, he states that Symeon's attacks against Byzantium are violation of oaths, denial of faith and corruption of piety. He adds that it is a great scandal that the Bulgarians and the Byzantines, who both are inheritors of the brotherhood of Christ, are not at peace and that earth should stop polluted with Christian blood. 36 It has been argued that, the identification of wars against Christians with civil wars is connected to the ideological and diplomatic developments of the period and to the adoption by the ruling Byzantine elite of an ideology which promoted the Christianization of foreign peoples as a means to exert political control over political entities that could not be easily subjugated by military means. 37 Ideological and religious arguments with regard to the military conflicts with the Bulgarians were employed after 1204. Kantakouzenos reports that when in 1328 the Bulgarians raided Byzantine territories in Thrace, Andronikos III sent an embassy to the Bulgarian ruler Michael [i{man (1323 Michael [i{man ( -1330 complaining that he had broken their agreements. Kantakouzenos adds that the Byzantine emperor protested that since both armies were of the same religion they should fight together against the impious, meaning the Turks. Kantakouzenos remarks that a similar discussion took place in 1332 on the eve of the battle of Rosokastron, where the Bulgarians under their ruler John Alexander (1331-1371) inflicted a crushing defeat on the army of Andronikos III. When the Bulgarian emperor sent an embassy asking for peace, suggesting that each side maintain whatever it possessed at that moment, Andronikos III replied that it was not he who started that war and added that it is not right for the Bulgarians and the Byzantines to fight against each other, since both are Christians. Instead, they should fight united against the impious. It is interesting that Gregoras, a supporter of Andronikos II and a critic of Andronikos III, attributes this statement to the Bulgarian emperor. 38 Kantakouzenos' statements that the Bulgarians and the Byzantines must not fight against each other should not lead to the conclusion that the later Byzantine empire had developed an ideology according to which wars against co-religious enemies were civil wars and should be avoided. By pointing out that he and Andronikos III opposed the wars against fellow Orthodox Christians, Kantakouzenos responds to the criticism that his policies contributed to the expansion of the Turks at the expense of the Byzantines and that he relied on Turkish allies and mercenaries to usurp the throne. Furthermore, when in 1323 and 1341 Kantakouzenos claims that he supported the waging of war against the Bulgarians, he made no reference to the religious identity of the enemy. Instead, in 1341 Kantakouzenos told the Bulgarian ruler John Alexander that he would not hesitate to send against him the army of the ruler of Ayd›n, Umur, who had offered to fight on the side of Kantakouzenos against the Bulgarians in exchange of booty. 39 Demetrios Kydones, who was the mesazwn of John VI Kantakouzenos, John V and Manuel II Palaiologos (1391-1425) , is another fourteenth-century author who commented on the religious character of the conflict between the Byzantines and the Bulgarians. In 1366, he wrote that it would be ideal to ally with the Serbians and the Bulgarians against the Turks; however, the Byzantines should not forget that in the past the Serbians and the Bulgarians had attacked and seized Byzantine lands without any provocation, that they had shown brutality towards the Byzantines, that they had imposed heavier taxation than the Turks, and they had not accepted the Byzantine proposal for alliance based on mutual religion. 40 Kydones made this statement in a period when the main priority of the Byzantine state was to attract military aid from the Latin west. Therefore it was important that people would be convinced that on the basis of past experiences the Byzantines could not expect any aid from their co-religious neighbours.
The comments of Kantakouzenos and Kydones with regard to the common religion of the Byzantines and the Bulgarians reflect their personal aims. It seems that in the late Byzantine period the dominating view of the Bulgarians in general is not one of brothers in faith, but of external enemies. For instance, Akropolites emphasizes the ethnic identity of the Bulgarians whom he calls race and kin (fulh, genoj) and points out their enduring hatred for the Romans. 41 Theodore II Laskaris (1255-1259), who led two expeditions against the Bulgarians, praises his father John III, for punishing the Bulgarians for their treacherous attitude and for reminding them of their ancient subjection to the Byzantines. 42 Pachymeres, who sees the military conflicts between the Byzantine state and its large groups of foreign mercenaries as civil wars, does not call the wars against Christian political entities civil wars.
The main conclusion of this study is that the perception of civil war in thirteenth and fourteenth-century Byzantium was one of a military conflict inside the Byzantine state and between subjects and employees of the emperor regardless of the ethnic, cultural and religious identity of the combatants. Therefore, the military conflicts with groups of soldiers of fortune who had been employed by the imperial authorities, such as the Catalan Grand Company, could be defined as civil wars. The late Byzantines were involved in wars against enemies with whom they shared a common cultural and religious identity, such as the state of Epiros and the principality of Thessaly. However, these conflicts were not seen as civil wars. Wishing to promote their legitimacy as successors to the Byzantine empire the Laskarids of Nicaea portrayed the Epirots as external enemies of the empire. The Palaiologoi did not view the Epirots as external enemies. Imperial propaganda under the Palaiologan rulers promoted the idea that the wars against other 'Byzantine' political entities were campaigns against rebellious subjects who resisted the legitimate authority of the Byzantine emperor. The wars against them were just wars the aim of which was their incorporation to the restored Byzantine empire. Therefore, it was possible wars against the same enemy to be seen either as civil wars or as wars against an external enemy or wars against rebels. This shows that often the definition of what was a civil war and what was a war against
